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ARTICLES
Human Rights and the Ethic of Care: A Framework for
Health Research and Practice
Philip Alcabes, Ph.D., M.P.H.* and Ann B. Williams, R.N., Ed.D.'
Wide gaps in health status, access to health care, quality of care, and
provision of health-related services are increasingly evident in the context
of globalization. In the face of glaring disparities between the health status
of the "Haves" and that of the "Have Nots," health professionals in
wealthier countries must consider the impact of such disparities on the
ethical conduct of health research. Unfortunately, currently established
codes of moral conduct fail to provide adequate guidance for ethical
decision-making in health research. Formal codes include the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) regulations for
protection of human subjects, the Nuremberg Code, the Helsinki
Declaration, and the guidelines of the Council for International
Organizations of Medical Sciences Taken together, these documents
constitute a body of important standards for protecting research subjects
from harm and regulating the balance between potential risks to subjects
and potential benefits. Yet, these standards fail to resolve ethical conflicts
between upholding human rights and producing more information for
medical benefit. Such conflicts are increasingly apparent as economic
globalization reveals the depth of international disparities in resources and
knowledge.
In this Article, we examine how an ethics based on caring and
responsibility can guide clinical research in a manner that is consistent
with human rights and justice in the face of global disparities. We review
two paradigms for moral reasoning-the morality of rights and the
morality of care-with respect to applying the principles of human rights
to health. The morality of rights relies on the abstract concept of justice to
guide behavior. The morality of care, as the name suggests, seeks to guide
decision-making in a way that takes care of others, examining real-world
conflicts and contexts to resolve moral dilemmas. As such, it can
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supplement the abstractions of justice, protection, and benefit to provide
ethical guidance in a wide variety of circumstances. We examine how the
two moral paradigms play out in a contemporary bioethical challenge-the
case of research related to Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) and
AIDS in the developing world. Finally, we propose an approach to ethical
decision-making for clinical research that we apply to the HIV/AIDS
experience, but which we believe has wider applicability.
We suggest that incorporation of a morality of care into the approach
to health research can deepen the ethical discussion, produce more
nuanced strategies for research planning, and identify and reinforce a
professional stance that is more responsive to both health disparities and
changing needs. A more versatile and caring ethical framework will offer
better guidance to researchers and health care providers when faced with
complex situations and ever-present disparities in an era of globalized
health research.
I. HUMAN RIGHTS AND HEALTH
The recognition that protection of human research subjects is a
proper public concern and the modern human rights movement are both
relatively young ideas. Medical experiments conducted in concentration
camps during World War II prompted military judges to promulgate the
standard of informed consent. 2 The Nuremberg decisions framed medical
research as a social-justice issue, as Robert Levine has noted. Wording in
the recent revision of the Helsinki Declaration on ethical principles for
human-subjects research captures social-justice concerns both explicitly,
with language about "appropriate caution.. .in the conduct of research
which may affect the environment, ''4 and implicitly, in a controversial
standard regarding controlled trials.
Beginning with the formation of the United Nations (U.N.) in 1945,
the principles of human rights have been codified in a series of
international declarations and treaties. The U.N. Charter was followed by
the International Bill of Human Rights (1948),6 the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966, revised 1994),' the
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (1966),8
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women (1981), 9 and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989).' 0
Human rights, as set out in these declarations, are primarily individual
rights in relation to governments. The human rights framework insists that
there are some things governments should not do, such as promote slavery
or allow torture, and there are other things governments should do, such
as protect freedom of expression and religion." The goal of the human
1I:2 (2002)
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rights movement is to ensure that people around the world survive and
have the opportunity to achieve their full potential. Clean water, adequate
nutrition, education, health care, and basic freedoms are prerequisites for
individuals and communities to flourish. Health care providers and other
health professionals should be involved in securing these benefits as rights.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), adopted by the
U.N. General Assembly shortly after the U.N. was formed, established a
common standard to which all peoples and nations may aspire. 2 Article 25,
the key section on health, states that everyone has the right to a standard
of living adequate to the health and well being of himself and his family,
including food, clothing, housing, medical care, and necessary social
services. The adoption of the UDHR by forty-eight member states reflects
the commitment of the international community to a minimal standard of
health care for all people. Subsequent, related covenants and treaties
underscore the responsibility of governments to provide the social,
political, and economic circumstances in which people can flourish. This
commitment is echoed in the World Health Organization's (WHO)
constitution, which states "the enjoyment of the highest attainable
standards of health is one of the fundamental rights of every human
being.", 3 Both failing to provide adequate opportunities for health and
directly preventing access to health care impede the enjoyment of the
highest attainable health standard.
While failing to guarantee universal access to clinical care is the most
obvious such defect, barriers to the enjoyment-of-health right more often
operate subtly at a social level. Since people are vulnerable to disease
through membership in society (for example, the common cold acquired
from one's neighbor), health cannot always be achieved by modifying
individual behavior. Those who occupy a lower rung of the social ladder
face a magnified problem, being both more likely to fall ill and less able to
seek help for it.14 By this token, creating and maintaining social and
economic differences that prevent individuals from obtaining basic
necessities also makes those people more prone to disease. Preventing
people from achieving their healthiest potential denies them a human
right. Such abuses of human rights, even though they may occur through
the social organization structure and economic potential rather than overt
punishment of individuals, demand that health care providers act to
support the right to health.
Here, we are asserting that abuses of health rights can be overt, or
subtly interwoven into economic structures. It is well established that the
role and status of individuals in a society determines their health fate. The
strongest predictor of health over the long run is neither heredity nor
3
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individual behavior, but social status. 15 For an examination of disease
distribution (who becomes ill) and disease outcome (who most often dies
or is disabled), the HIV/AIDS epidemic is revealing. In each country the
epidemic initially affects specific groups, depending on how and where the
virus enters that society. However, over time it concentrates among those
parts of the population who hold the least power and who live on the
edges of society.
1 6
Fifteen to twenty years ago, the highest incidence rates of AIDS were
seen in America's large coastal cities. For instance, in the first thirteen
months of the AIDS epidemic (i.e., between June 1981 and July 1982),
48% of cases came from New York City (217 of 452).17 Today, the highest
incidences are in the rural South. In 1999, 41% of U.S. AIDS cases were
diagnosed in the South, compared to 29% in the Northeast, and even
smaller proportions in other regions.
1
8
The pattern of downward social mobility of epidemic disease is not
new; other illnesses have followed a similar pattern. For example,
tuberculosis, once the emblem of an elitist and delicate lifestyle in the
West, 9 is now almost exclusively a disease of the poor.2 0 Asthma, an allergy-
like condition to which innate susceptibility is probably universal, is now so
common among the urban poor that it has become a cause cilbre to
21advocates for improved housing and health care in northeastern cities.
Yet, advances in political and economic rights have not necessarily
been accompanied by improvements in health. For instance, the collapse
of an oppressive political apparatus in the former Soviet Union was
followed by economic disruption and social chaos with major health
consequences. Increases in crime and disparities in resources led to serious
disease in overcrowded prisons, epidemics in many communities, and a
decline in life expectancy. In some Asian countries (e.g., China and
Vietnam), economic reforms and the opening of society to Western
influence has increased drug abuse and commercial sex, and the diseases
that travel with them. The Chinese remind us to consider the potential
untoward consequences of beneficial innovations, saying that "it is good to
open the window and let in fresh air, but flies may enter as well."
The human rights framework highlights the dynamic nature of the
relationship between fundamental human rights and health. It provides
language to describe the common experience of oppression among people
around the world and facilitates communication across disciplines,
including health care workers, politicians, lawyers, community activists,
and others. The nature of the work they do requires that health
professionals practice in relationship with others, either individuals or
populations. Human rights abuses-including lack of resources-obstruct
11:2 (2002)
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professional practice in that they compromise these relationships through
limiting the ability to provide care. The difference between care that is
unaffordable or inaccessible, and care that is inadequate or intermittent, is
no real difference at all. Health professionals who care for those on both
sides of the divide-the impoverished and the privileged-are thus held
hostage by such abuses.
While health professionals might be unable to change political systems
or engrained economic structures in ways that grossly eliminate underlying
disparities and impediments to health, their sense of professionalism or
humanitarian responsibility moves them, and often leads them to feel
obligated to take action against such abuses. It is in this way that the
actions of individual professionals who provide health service or conduct
research are linked to human rights.
II. SPECIFIC ISSUES
We begin our consideration of the link between human rights and
health-research ethics by turning to specific issues. The following six
themes arise often when patients and health care providers make decisions
about research participation. Naturally, we are especially interested in the
choices available when research is done in the context of health disparities
and/or where complex motivations obscure definitions of right and wrong.
A. Medical Progress
The desire to acquire more information motivates virtually every
clinical trial (along with all health research in general). Researchers and
supporters of research hope that ways of improving health can be devised
if better information is available. Clearly, the health care provider's desire
to gain more knowledge that could help patients aligns with the
researcher's motivation to advance medical science and contribute to
progress.
But progress for whom? "Medical progress" is for the common good; it
has no meaning at the individual level, and we should not pretend that it
does. If a research protocol helps one person, but only one, to survive, it
has benefited that person, even if it fails to further medical knowledge, and
even if it fails to help large numbers of people. Will a research protocol
that is beneficial to one or a small number of individuals be abandoned
because it fails to rise to the "progress" standard?
Researchers, potential research participants, and health care providers
must recognize the disjunction between contributing to collective progress
and alleviating an individual's suffering. The researcher seeks to benefit
5
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humankind, an abstract notion of good. The individual participant
experiences direct effects of research participation, and finds empirically
that his or her decision to participate was either good or bad. It is the
health care provider who is most directly challenged by the disjunction
between collective and individual benefit. Allied with the researcher by
discipline and training, the health care provider values the abstract benefit
of research, but at the same time is allied with the patient by predisposition
and consent to offer services. Therefore, the provider must also attend to
the individual effects of participating in the research. Which choice
between the two is right is likely to be uncertain. Which choice supports
caring is clearer.
A deeper problem emerges when there is a material disparity in
resources between where the research is devised and funded, and where it
is carried out. Progress is highly valued in the technology-heavy economies
of the western industrialized nations; here, the potential for progress is an
accepted rationale for running the risks of research. In the developing
world, progress is different-more pressing wants, differing world views,
and less dependence on technical advance give progress in the abstract a
more equivocal valuation. The fact that progress arising from the fruits of
medical research is more likely to benefit the people of the country that
funds the research than those of the country where it is carried out
magnifies the divergent weighing of "progress." Researchers from wealthy
nations cannot assume that medical progress is a good reason for any
individual to participate in research, and even less so when the individual
lives in a developing country.
B. Altruism
Linked to the multiple disparities that energize "medical progress" as
an ethical problem is altruism. We suggest that altruism is largely
constructed by researchers or research funders who seek to justify plans
that are at best paternalistic.
The word altruism itself reveals the purely positivist roots of the
concept. "Altruism" was introduced into English in the mid-1800s by the
translators of Comte, who gave it its present meaning.2 To believe in
altruism implies a belief that social good is measurable, and preferable to
good for the individual. When researchers suggest that an individual will
enroll in their study for what they term "altruistic reasons," they are saying
that while participating in research could be harmful to the individual, the
study could be beneficial to people in general. The ethical choice has been
made by the researchers. To them, it is a choice between abstractions. By
deciding to go forward with research, however, they pile moral freight onto
11:2 (2002)
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the decision of prospective participants.
To the individuals who must decide to participate or not, the choice is
different. The prospective participants must choose between choices. First,
they have to decide at the level of their own comfort and security whether
to enter the personally non-ideal state of research participation. Next, they
must decide on the basis of their own beliefs whether to consider the
potential benefit of the research to the community at large. The fact that
the research has been approved by some recognized authority and is going
forward-that is, that the decision has been made by the researchers-
alters the valence of the prospective participant's decision-making. Being
told that the research might benefit everyone, the prospective participant's
decision to enter a study or not becomes a question of selfishness or
selflessness. The individual's moral equipoise is lost. The situation is liable
to become even further determined if the health care provider,
particularly a trusted health care provider, endorses the research.
The term "altruism" is thus a tip-off to an ethical squeeze play. Health
care providers who sign on with a research project change the weighting of
the choices their patients are faced with. The researcher who proffers
altruism as a legitimate reason for people to submit to the imperfect state
of research participation ignores the dual-level nature of the actual
decision to participate, and subtly injects a moral suasion into that
decision. An individual's decision, especially if the research participation
has been presented by the individual's own care provider, is complexly
freighted, far from simple, and worthy of careful and not rule-bound
attention.
C. Equipoise
Equipoise is the state of not knowing which of two claims is true. In the
context of health research, equipoise refers to the investigator's honest
ignorance as to which of two interventions is more beneficial. Many writers
have emphasized the central importance of this state of not knowing in the
ethics of health research. If one treatment regimen is clearly more effective
than others, subjecting patients to the less-effective approach(es) violates
the consensus standard expressed in the Helsinki Declaration-that
everyone is entitled to the highest current standard of care. Only if the
researcher is genuinely undecided about which approach is better is it
justifiable to conduct a clinical trial. Benjamin Freedman rejected
individual equipoise on the part of the investigator, the true absence of
what he called "treatment preference," as an impediment to carrying out
clinical trials. Charles Weijer and others have joined Freedman in
advocating community equipoise as a hedge against disingenuous
7
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contentions on the part of researchers that they were truly uncertain of
whether there was a difference between treatments A and B. Not just the
investigator, but the medical community, these authors claim, must be
genuinely uncertain as to whether treatment A is preferable to treatment
23B, or the reverse. Equipoise, by these claims, makes it permissible to
expose some individuals to a new treatment that is (or later turns out to
be) less effective than the best treatment.
Levine has argued that equipoise motivates research in two ways. 4 Not
knowing which approach is better generates a need to find out. The
research (with its attendant risks and discomforts) is therefore justifiable if
it serves to relieve equipoise in a way that helps to decide which approach
is better. If the results suggest that one treatment is better than others,
equipoise is lost, and the researcher is obligated to stop the study even if
the full protocol has not been completed. Today, standards for stopping
are normally incorporated into clinical trial protocols, an acknowledgment
of the necessary equipoise principle.
If equipoise is the principle on which ethical enrollment in clinical
trials is based, then the point where equipoise vanishes is an ethical
fulcrum. Clearly, the exact point at which evidence makes a new treatment
look better than placebo can be different for one health care provider
than for another. Clinical trials attempt to standardize that point, so that
all health professionals will agree that it is not yet proven that treatment is
preferable to placebo. The clinical trial thus obviates decision-making on'
the part of the individual health care provider and researcher and justifies
its own continuation--or the inception of another trial. But appeals to the
medical community to decide when treatment A is better than B invite the
certainty of consensus, but do not necessarily produce truth (that would be
true even if the nature of "community" in medicine were not so elusive).
Codifying how to draw inferences from clinical trials does not entirely
work. Part of the discomfort health care providers experience when
enrolling patients into some clinical trials comes from their own sense that
the placebo and treatment options are not really equivalent, no matter
what the medical community says. The health care provider is again
hostage.
Justifying research through consensus or community equipoise-as
clinical trials invoke-lifts from the shoulders of both the researcher and
health care provider the responsibility to decide whether they believe the
study treatments to be equipoised. It also eliminates the prospective
participant's belief from the ethical equation. A more versatile approach
would embrace the varied, and potentially conflicting, beliefs of all parties
involved. But then equipoise could not be the sole motivation for research,
11:2 (2002)
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and relieving equipoise could not be the primary justification for
entertaining its risks. Like medical progress, equipoise would have to be
demoted from its major role in ethical decision-making if the ethics of
health research were based on the complexities of caring for individuals
acting individually.
D. Placebo Control
Results of a randomized, placebo-controlled trial are the sine qua non
of evidence in an increasingly evidence bound, health science
establishment. Investigators who seek to find a good prophylactic or
treatment regimen are essentially required to mount a placebo-controlled
trial. Even if researchers are concerned that patients given placebo are not
receiving adequate care, they might find no alternative to the placebo-
controlled trial. If the treatment's efficacy is to be believed and the
treatment used so that people can be helped, some people-the
participants who are randomized to the placebo arm-will have to receive
no treatment at all. Of course, occasionally a treatment is harmful, and
placebo recipients are the lucky ones. Still, the randomized, placebo-
controlled trial often, albeit not always, stakes adequate care for some
patients today against the hope of better care for many patients tomorrow.
That wager presents caring researchers everywhere with a dilemma.
But health care providers in resource-poor regions must face this problem
on a magnified scale. Where there is too little money to pay for treatment
for all, the availability of a placebo-controlled research protocol moves
health care providers to a Hobson's choice. They must decide between two
situations that compromise care: Either no or inadequate treatment for all
of their patients, or potentially effective treatment for some. Those who
enter the trial and are randomized to the active-treatment arm will receive
treatment that might be effective; those randomized to the placebo arm
are certain to receive no treatment.
The World Medical Association chose to address the placebo dilemma
directly in the recent revision of its statement on ethical principles for
research involving human subjects. It stated unequivocally that new
treatments must be tested against the best current treatment, not a
placebo.2" Placebo trials are to be undertaken only when there is no proven
treatment. Although this seems straightforward, in many real world
situations, the ethics of a placebo arm are not immediately obvious. As the
case of HIV/AIDS drugs will show, conducting placebo-controlled trials of
inexpensive regimens in poor nations when the effectiveness of more
expensive regimens has been demonstrated is a Solomon's dilemma. If a
trial goes forward, some people will not do as well as others, because some
9
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will receive placebo. If no trial is carried out, nobody will be treated. Thus,
no matter which choice is made, research perpetuates inequality in access
to health. The morality of care and human rights would recognize that
social injustice lies at the root of the dilemma, and then indicate that
action to correct larger social disparities be linked to furthering research
agendas.
E. Informed Consent
The right to informed consent established a new standard ofjustice in
health research when it was agreed on as part of the Nuremberg Code.
However, even informed consent cannot transform offering a treatment
regimen that is less than optimally beneficial into good care. Getting
people to agree to receive a lesser standard of care does not make offering
inadequate care acceptable. In this light, informed consent assists the
pursuit of justice in research, but it does not by itself guarantee that the
obligations of caring have been discharged.
As practiced in the United States today, research participants have the
right not only to be informed about the procedures entailed in research
and their potential risks and benefits, but also the right to understand. The
current interpretation of informed consent thus closes the gap between
researchers' discharging their obligation to inform, and the patients'
needs to know and understand what is going to happen-a divide that
emerges readily when research procedures are described in technical
jargon. By observing the informed-consent standard, justice is done in that
all prospective subjects are equally aware and, therefore, equally able to
choose.
But is that the only gap? The assertion that awareness creates choice
seems problematic. Certainly, lack of awareness of possible risks and
benefits diminishes the range of choices available to the subject. But full
awareness, as the modern informed consent standard seeks to achieve,
might still leave many choices unavailable-precluded by the patient's
economic resources, class, sex, or race, or by a desire to please his or her
family or health care provider.
Neither is the dilemma of the placebo alleviated by informed consent.
That patients know, or are told, that they might receive placebo does satisfy
an abstract concept of justice (e.g., that awareness creates choice), but it
does not relieve the caring researcher's or the caring provider's burden of
choosing between two unwanted situations. Consider the situation in
which the person who normally provides care to a patient also acts as
collaborator on a professional colleague's research project. As part of
informed consent, the provider explains the research project to the
11:2 (2002)
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patient, offers all the information required under informed-consent
guidelines, and asks for consent to participate. Should health care
providers make clear to the patient their opinion about the wisdom of
participating? If so, on what criteria should that be based?
The ethical conundrum is highlighted here: If health care providers
discuss the choice about participation because of their concern for the
patient's personal situation, must the providers acknowledge their own
interest in the research project's success-even though that
acknowledgment reveals that they are not interested solely in the patient's
welfare? If the providers do not discuss their own role, are they offering the
patient full enough disclosure about the situation, and in particular about
how their own alliance with the researchers might alter their presumed
alliance with the patient for whom they care? Informed consent elicits an
ethical challenge about care, even as it resolves one about justice.
F. Medical Care for Research Participants
Marcia Angell asserts that when investigators enroll subjects in clinical
trials, they assume a responsibility analogous to that of clinicians.2 6 Are
investigators, therefore, responsible for elevating the health status of
participants in their studies, or are they entitled to leave unimproved the
poor health standing of a population so long as the investigation meets the
standard test of "doing no harm?" The revised Helsinki Declaration
addresses a portion of this problem, recommending only the best proven
therapy as the standard against which new treatments must be tested. But
the Declaration also states that at the conclusion of the study, all subjects
should be provided access to the best treatment demonstrated by the
study.
27
Some researchers contend that the gulf between rich countries and
poor ones sanctions different standards of care on its two sides, and
therefore what would be unacceptable study designs in the United States
are appropriate in Africa or Asia. The power of this argument lies in its
appeal to practicality and compassion. Its unarticulated assumption is that
the economic gap is inevitable. However, the capacity of wealthy nations to
ignore moral accounts that emphasize their own responsibility to alleviate
suffering helps to generate and maintain that gap. While wealth might be
produced in developed nations without impoverishing the less developed
world, the burden of ensuring that the poor are well cared for is a costly
one. Rich countries shoulder it only up to a point.
One way to elide their own moral complicity in perpetuating the
economic gap is for policy makers in developed countries to pretend that
the issue is an abstract one, resolvable by attending to standards of practice
11
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or a disingenuous appeal for medical compassion. The responsibility to
care enjoins us to provide the best possible health services and the best
proven therapy. Indeed, to withdraw health care because of concerns
about research ethics might prove even more invidious to the health rights
of developed countries than to go forward with questionable research. Still,
a full realization of the morality of care would dictate action to improve the
material context, so that consent will not be coerced by social
circumstance.
III. CURRENT PARADIGMS
How the individual health worker should act to preserve human rights
and invigorate the quest for expanding human rights is the crux of health
ethics. Most modem Western ethical systems are based on universal
concepts of justice and equality. A significant alternative approach,
explicated only in recent years, is based on caring and attentiveness to the
complexity of human interrelationships. The two paradigms often lead to
identical or similar ethical decisions, and the boundaries between them are
controversial.28 We begin by summarizing them separately.
A. Morality of Rights
The various codes governing biomedical ethics today are grounded in
liberal theories of justice, human rights, and contract theory. Levine's
discussion of the basis of medical ethical codes in deontological (duty-
based) and utilitarian (pleasure-based or utility-based) theories brings out
the dialectical relation between them. We see these codes as revealing also
a melding of Kantian rationalism with the democratic liberalism
introduced byJohn Rawls.29
Kant's categorical imperative offered the foundation for abstract
morality.30 It assumes that all humans have access to reason (even if we do
not always use it). "True" moral principles therefore emerge as universal
and could be derived not from perception, which might be shifting or
faulty, but through the ubiquitous faculty of reasoning. Kantian moralism
is necessarily abstract, since it rejects practice as grounds for moral
decision-making. It also assumes that correct moral principles are
impartial, because only impartial tenets can apply universally. Finally,
because it requires that moral narratives be "read" through reason, it
assumes that what is moral is correct or right. We see Kantian moralism in
health care in the injunction to "do no harm." More tendentiously, we see
it in the controversial contention that what is the highest standard of care
for the wealthy ought also be the standard of care for the poor. Here,
11:2 (2002)
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justice and care can agree.
Rights-based morality draws also on the utilitarian underpinnings of
Western liberalism. Utilitarian values offer a slightly different valence to
moral decision-making. Jeremy Bentham and his follower, John Stuart Mill,
distanced themselves from Kant, centering ethical decision-making on the
principle of pleasure (Bentham) or happiness (Mill)l31 Bentham's "felicific
calculus" sought to maximize good, rejecting the existence of any consistent
natural law that could give rise to moral right. Utilitarian thought can
accept moral accounts on a case-by-case basis. For instance, in modern
liberal decision-making, an action such as killing might be sanctioned in
one set of circumstances (e.g., war against fascism) and proscribed in
another (e.g., genocide). Both choices about killing are moral, because in
each case the decision helped to maximize good.
In this sense, utilitarian morality moves away from the categorical
nature of Kantian morality. But while utilitarianism changes the principle
on which the moral code is based from truth to happiness, it shares some
ideas with Kant's morality. Moral behavior is still guided by "do" and
"don't." Even a resolution of an ethical dilemma that is situation specific
will be based on an appeal to the abstract-good or happiness. The moral
code is impartial, in the sense that the identity of the individual(s) helped
by the decision is irrelevant.
In current health care ethics, we see utilitarian moralism at play in the
debate about managed care, whether through private or socialized
insurance. Management of health care costs allows for more efficient cost
sharing and therefore minimizes payments overall. By making care
provision less subject to patients' characteristics like knowledge or
affluence, it provides the "happiness," or increase in community well
being, of expanding the availability of adequate care. Utilitarian views also
offer a justification for the State to detain and forcibly treat disease
sufferers whose failure to comply with prescribed therapies makes them a
threat to others. For instance, New York City has, at times, maintained
locked isolation facilities at one or more municipal hospitals for the
custody and treatment of tuberculosis patients who remain infectious
because they failed to take anti-tuberculosis chemotherapy. While liberal
justice would normally reject the incarceration of individuals who are
guilty of no crime, the courts have supported detention of infectious
tubercular people on the basis of protecting the public's health.
The last major influence on rights-based morality comes from
32democratized or populist pragmatism. Rawls' theory of "reflective
equilibrium 33 and agreed-upon principles of justice, and the explicit
contract approach that emerges from it,34 guide important aspects of ethics
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that are evident in codes like the Helsinki Declaration. The
indispensability of informed consent reflects contract theory: It honors a
subjective decision by the participant, forged in agreement with a
researcher, to seek mutually what each wants individually.
Thus, the morality-of-rights approach is based on principles that at any
one time could include some of the following: impartiality, equality,
beneficence, and individual autonomy. These principles lead to rules that
we see in the articles of the several codes of conduct (e.g., Helsinki). They
seek to uphold specific attributes of care for people. The conjunction of
care and rights here is notable. However, it remains abstract, as we discuss
below.
Some of the attributes of rights-based ethics are privacy,35 the right to
information,36 disclosure,37 risk communication, 8 and avoidance of harm.39
Privacy, associated with deontological morals, is also a tenet of contract
theory. Individuals are assumed capable of reason and judicious choice, at
least on their own behalf. Privacy gives rise to the right of confidentiality,
particularly in American health ethics. Here, rights are abstract: Privacy
and confidentiality support equality, and thus liberal justice, but they have
no obvious link to care.
The right to information comes directly from a Rawlsian view of
justice: People must know what is wrong with them and what might happen
to them if they are to be able to seek freely just solutions to the problems
of ill health and unequally distributed resources. The information right
links with the privacy right to create an uneasy equality, or at least a
leveling of the playing field. And it implies that holders of information
must share it. For the individual that obligation generates a right of
disclosure; for the group, it generates a right to know what its risks are.
The avoidance of harm is the old Hippocratic principle, embraced by
both categorical and utilitarian models (reducing harm is a virtue in itself,
and it is a measure of the optimization of good or happiness). In contract
approaches to justice, avoiding harm can be an index of the success of
liberalization, the quality of the dissemination of rights. 40 It is the most
implicit element of the philosophies underlying rights and, as we discuss
below, an explicit aspect of care-based ethics. Avoidance of harm provides
an important interface between the abstract ethics of rights and the
empirical ethics of care.
Indeed, the principles developed through philosophies of moral
imperatives are abundantly evident to caregivers, either as intuited truths
or received wisdom, or through training and practice. All of the privacy
and information rights are tenets of caring. Often enough, practitioners
derive these principles unconsciously, through the conscious practice of
11:2 (2002)
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care. The distinction, we argue, lies in whether these tenets remain
principles for judgment or assessment only, or move the practitioner or
researcher to act. Careful health care practitioners are aware of their need
to balance patients' needs for privacy and confidentiality with a right to
know about threats or risks. They also seek to avoid harm to the patient as
it presents itself in a given clinical situation. And they reinforce the
positioning of the patient in an idiosyncratic social support system, as well
as in the larger society. We will return to this distinction after reviewing the
basics of a morality of care.
B. Morality of Care
The choices offered by, and decisions made from, a justice-based
rights paradigm too often fail to answer the real-world concerns of
individuals and populations who are the vulnerable subjects of health
research. In contrast, in 1982, Carol Gilligan initially described an ethic of
responsibility and care expressed by young women, which looks closely at
context, including networks of relationships and power as a guide to the
moral path.4' The consequences of decisions are considered, along with
whether the decisions are right and just. For example, a woman debating
an abortion might consider not only her personal beliefs about when life
begins, but also the impact of her decision on others to whom she feels
responsibilities.
Among the health professions, nursing has evidenced a particular
interest in the development of an ethic of care.42 Because the practice of
nursing in its purest form is essentially the act of caring for another human
being, it is not surprising that nurse-philosophers find an ethic of care
attractive. Nursing is largely a profession of women; and the fact that
discussions of caring have been strongly influenced by the feminist
perspective of its first theorists, Carol Gilligan and Nell Noddings,43 is
almost certainly responsible for some of its appeal to the profession.
There has been less formal discussion of the principles underlying an
ethic of care in medicine. However, at least one philosopher-physician,
Edmund Pellegrino, writes eloquently about the physician's duty to care
for the patient by feeling compassion, doing for them what they cannot do
for themselves, accepting responsibility, and acting competently."
Some writers have proposed that there is no real distinction between
an ethics of justice and an ethics of care. They hold that justice is based on
caring, albeit implicitly, and argue that differentiating morality as based on
either rights or caring is a response to a political calculus that has to do
with class, sex, and sometimes race." We agree that caring underlies
justice, and that rights may be derived through the practice of care as
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readily as they can be received as principles enunciated in response to a
philosophical view of virtue or justice. But, we emphasize a distinction
between ethics based on abstract principles of right and ethics arising from
a caring willingness to adjust practice to the demands placed by real
situations and social structures on individuals. We argue that this
distinction is important in recognizing where existing codes of medical
ethics are too rigid or insensitive, and pointing the way toward a more
responsive and satisfying approach.
IV. CASE STUDY: HIV/AIDS RESEARCH IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD
In 1997 discord erupted in the pages of the venerable New England
Journal of Medicine when physicians conducting clinical trials in Africa and
Asia to investigate the efficacy of strategies to reduce maternal-fetal
transmission of HIV were accused of unethically exploiting the desperation
of poor countries hit hard by the HIV/AIDS epidemic. 4 6 The charge was
that the trials of simple and inexpensive anti-retroviral regimens, which
included placebo arms, would have been unacceptable in the sponsoring
countries. Results of an earlier study conducted in the United States and
France documented the effectiveness of a more complicated and expensive
regimen in reducing maternal-fetal HIV transmission.47 The AIDS Clinical
Trials Group (ACTG) protocol 076 study demonstrated that zidovudine
(AZT), administered for six months during pregnancy, intrapartum, and
to the newborn, reduced the probability of transmission of HIV from
mother to infant. That expensive regimen quickly became the standard of
care for HIV-infected pregnant women in the sponsoring countries, but
was deemed impractical for the developing world.
Studies in Africa and Asia sought a shorter, cheaper prophylactic
regimen, by testing possible substitutes for the ACTG-076 regimen against
placebo. These studies were sponsored by a number of U.S. institutions,
including academic institutions and the National Institutes of Health
(NIH) ,4 in collaboration with foreign researchers. Concerns emerged
about the acceptability of placebo use-given that six months of AZT
therapy had already been shown to be efficacious, equipoise was obviously
unattainable. Investigators countered, arguing that the ACTG regimen was
neither affordable nor practicable in the developing world so that testing
shorter, less expensive regimens against placebo was still acceptable.
Controversy ensued. A month later, a letter from the then-heads of the
U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the NIH
called for H1V/AIDS research to be developed in concert with local
authorities, acknowledging that differences in resources created differing
needs.4 9 In February 1998, four agencies responsible for overseeing
11:2 (2002)
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placebo-controlled trials of HIV/AIDS therapies in developing countries
issued a joint statement asking that placebo use be halted in such trials.
The CDC, NIH, Joint United Nations Programme on AIDS (UNAIDS), and
the Agence Nationale de Recherche sur la SIDA stopped short of outright
embargo on placebo-controlled trials, but their statement changed the
debate.
In April 1998, the American Journal of Public Health published six articles
relating to this issue.5° Two editorials specifically addressed the ethics
question. Mervyn Susser, then editor-in-chief, argued in favor of placebo-
controlled trials in order to generate the information needed to produce
treatment regimens affordable in the developing world.5 Ruth Faden and
Nancy Kass were more equivocal. They sought to hold researchers to a
high standard of justice, placing the burden of proof on investigators to
show why clinical research should be conducted in a population that
normally cannot avail itself of the very therapy under study. They rejected
cultural relativism in research, but did ask how constraints on spending
affect the ethics of research. Faden and Kass thus left open the question of
whether it is the role of researchers to redress the impact of deprivation on
their subjects.
Heated discussion of these issues continued in professional meetings
and journals, expanding into a debate regarding the ethical obligations of
researchers to care for the human subjects who participate in their trials. A
subsequent study of HIV transmission between heterosexual partners in
Uganda53 elicited new questions about the ethics of research practice and
underscored the unsettled nature of the debate.54 The Uganda study
randomly assigned residents of rural villages to receive specially provided
care for sexually transmissible infections or usual care; the latter meant
referral to government clinics. In addition, no anti retroviral therapy was
offered to the several hundred HIV-infected subjects.
One of the outcomes of interest in the Uganda study was new HIV
incidence in sex partners of already HIV-positive participants. Anti-
retroviral therapy might have reduced the potential for HIV transmission,
which would have biased this important study endpoint. The investigators
were thus able to reach unbiased conclusions about HIV transmission
because "antiretrovial drugs are not available in rural Uganda.
Consequently, the HIV-1 RNA levels were not influenced by the use of anti-
retroviral drugs. ''55 In an editorial response, Angell looked not simply at the
scientific benefit of avoiding bias, but also at the human downside. She
asked whether it is sufficient for health researchers merely to do no harm,
or if a higher standard is in order. She wondered whether investigators
from resource-rich countries like the United States ought not be held
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responsible for elevating the compromised health condition of the
participants in their studies.56
Much of the discussion about HIV/AIDS clinical trials turned on the
just distribution of the risks and benefits of research among investigators,
sponsors, research participants, and non-participants. In this case, such
benefits included: the provision of adequate antenatal zidovudine to
minimize the vertical transmission of HIV; the offering of better AIDS
treatment than prevailing local standards (frequently the local standard is
no treatment); the finding of information that is useful for HIV prevention
or improved AIDS clinical care; and the attracting of research dollars that
can generate employment or bring needed goods into resource-poor
countries.
In ocder to address the problem of just distribution of risks and
benefits of research, the assessment of risks in this case must acknowledge
that real disease risk, a prediction about likeliness, is embedded in a matrix
of broad concerns. A developing country is imperiled by endorsing
research, largely in the form of possible financial costs or disruption of
existing social and administrative structures. More serious risks are
potential human rights violations that are identified but fail to be resolved.
The poorer health of citizens in developing countries might become more
obvious in the context of Western-sponsored and sometimes hi-tech
research; certainly, the inadequacy of health care systems that must run on
shoestring budgets becomes both apparent and visible to the world at large
once Western research installations illustrate the disparities involved.
Ethical doubt about the HIV/AIDS research in developing countries
that these problems generated was exacerbated by questions as to the
investigators' equipoise and the adequacy of informed consent. In this
case, equipoise, supposedly an indispensable principle of rights-based
research ethics, proved to be flexible and open to redefinition once a
national border had been crossed. Ratification of the research by local
authorities ostensibly operating in citizens' best interest, but with
opportunity to reap political or economic gain by cooperating with wealthy
countries, clouded the ethical picture from a standpoint of informed
consent. Informed consent was revealed in this case to be a protection
wholly dependent on a subject's ability to recognize options. It was readily
coerced by the wishes of the holders of financial power in resource-scarce
situations. In sum, the ethical perspective of rights was confounded by the
substantial differences in financial resources between the countries
sponsoring the research and those serving as their venue.
We contend that any assertions of altruism in these developing-country
studies should have withered in the light of their upshot: The rights of
11:2 (2002)
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study subjects to the "highest attainable standard of health," as the WHO
constitution avers, were denied. Whether this abrogation of human rights
was the fault of feckless funders, self-interested investigators, venal national
leadership, or simply a presumptively inert global economic divide became
the issue-not the protection of human rights themselves. The rights-based
ethical codes failed, and the particular principles those codes motivate, like
informed consent and equipoise, were exposed as both inadequate and
easily co-opted.
We suggest that the intensity and persistence of controversy over this
research bespeaks a fundamental deficiency of the standard ethics-of-rights
framework. If the most effective treatment is not available in a country, is
research to find one that can be made available-even if it is clearly less
effective than the best-permissible? Obviously, once a clinical trial
demonstrated the efficacy of an anti-retroviral regimen in reducing
perinatal HIV transmission, albeit an expensive regimen, there is no
equipoise between placebo and any version of that regimen. Arguments
alleging that it is truly not known whether less expensive, abbreviated
regimens would be preferable to no treatment at all are disingenuous.
Peter Lurie and Sydney Wolfe have advocated equivalency trials, rather
than placebo-controlled trials, of HIV/AIDS medications in developing
countries.-7 Their argument highlights a potential opt-out to the Helsinki
Declaration requirement that subjects receive the best proven therapy.
Equipoise is no guide, then, even under Helsinki. Ethical decision-making
in this situation has to be more broadly based than reliance on equipoise
alone will allow.
An ethics grounded in the morality of rights can be made more
appropriate for the rapidly emerging global health community and better
able to safeguard human rights by tempering it with an ethics based on
responsibility and care. Ethical guidance to researchers and practitioners
in these situations should have recognized the disparities in resources,
access to health care services, and expectations about health and longevity
encountered in international research. But, it should also go beyond that,
to acknowledge those disparities' consequences as well. The impact of
researchers' interventions should be shown explicitly to accord with those
of health care providers: To begin by doing no harm, proceed to ensure
that harm is not done to patients/subjects inadvertently or incidentally,
seek to satisfy individuals' needs, and only then aim to benefit humankind.
Specifically, before research begins in a developing country, an ethics of
care would ask researchers to assess the ways in which subjects in that
country are presently denied access to the human right of adequate health.
This approach would highlight and support professionalism and articulate
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the alliance of health care with health research.
While a truly care-based model resists codification, we suggest that two
key outcomes of the explicit linkage of research with care would emerge.
First, an additional ethical standard would be posited: How does the
proposed research seek to address inequities, eliminate the identified
disparities, or otherwise respond to the absence of adequate health? An
investigation in the mid-1990s that compared two different approaches to
preventing mother-to-fetus HIV transmission with one as effective as that
demonstrated in the ACTG-076 would meet this test. Similarly, a study of
sexually transmitted diseases (STDs) and HIV transmission in Uganda that
offered anti-retroviral therapy and one of two different forms of STD
treatment would meet the test. Research comparing an alternative regimen
for interruption of vertical HIV transmission to placebo would fail this test,
as would the Quinn protocol that studied HIV transmission rates in the
absence of anti-retroviral therapy. We note that both of the hypothetical
investigations that would meet the proposed ethical standard would do so
even if the investigations were carried out in the United States.
Secondly, at the level of individual researchers, sound ethics would
require care. Specifically, investigators would consider not merely each
prospective subject's consent to participate as a test criterion for ethical
enrollment. Rather, they would assess whether participating in the planned
study would alleviate or exacerbate health problems for each prospective
subject. They would evaluate this question in light of each participant's
social and economic situation. For the subjects in the poorest countries,
this test would mean attending to possibly multiple and complex problems
involving family and social groups (e.g., waterborne parasites, malaria,
food or water scarcity, and infant diarrhea, in addition to HIV). When
competing potential benefits emerged, the researcher would seek a path
that generated the broadest benefit (e.g., for the family as well as the
patient) or minimized potential harm or loss. The assessment would
therefore be different for a head of household or family breadwinner than
for a child, different for a person who is ill than for a healthy one, and
different for men or women who have regular jobs than for the
unemployed. The researcher would consider the potential toxicity of
chemotherapeutic regimens, logistical difficulties of reaching study or
treatment clinics, and the social hardships arising from the possible loss of
a family member if treatment is ineffective. While the hands-on practice of
delivering care might be left to professional care providers, researchers
would be enjoined to make decisions that are based in the practice of care.
11:2 (2002)
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V. PROPOSAL
We propose that the question of what constitutes care and harm must
be central to the research process. Caring, and attention to the multi-
tiered complexities of upholding the human right of each individual to
receive care, can serve as the foundation for clinical-research ethics that
avoid harm. Technical and administrative fixes to ethical problems, like
novel study designs or better oversight by international agencies, are aimed
at resolving the distribution-of-justice problem, but they fail to address the
fundamental question about preserving individual rights and offering good
individual care. Solutions distributing risks and rewards among groups, the
utilitarian moral path, fail to alleviate harm and fall short of guaranteeing
the best care. Rather than distributive justice, research ethics should be
guided by individual responsibility and care.
An ethical framework based on responsibility and caring is practicable
for researchers and clinicians. In contrast to the difficulty most individuals
experience in trying to elucidate abstract justice, both researchers and
clinicians usually can discern a scale of harm to individuals either arising
from a given action or pre-existing. Their professionalism lies in their
ability to gauge harms accurately and assess how their own actions in a
particular situation will reduce harms. Thus, standards for research ethics,
can take the form of supporting professional decision-making in assessing
potential harms within observable relationships among those who stand to
lose or gain. Ethical choice can be based on minimizing observable harms
and ensuring that those who need care receive it.
Such a basis for ethics in research means that manifold health
disparities might have to be redressed before research can be done. The
search for a single, just standard of clinical and/or research practice will
inevitably be compromised by the social and economic reality of global
disparities in health status, access, and resources. Recognizing that justice
will be compromised by any solution in the current context, the morality of
care and human rights compels social action by health care providers. The
response to Angell's question about the researchers' responsibility for the
economic distress of the place where they are conducting research is
answerable: Resolving disparity cannot be separated from the conduct of
ethical research.
What we are proposing amounts to a reconfiguration of the debate
around research ethics. We believe that the aims of health care and public
health are served by organizing the discussion of international justice in
research around the principle of caring and the avoidance of harm. This
discussion, which should involve both investigators and health care
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providers, will be of more general applicability than to the HIV/AIDS field
alone.
Most painful moral problems are not simple choices between
competing rights, but complex situations of conflicting responsibilities.
Resolution requires an approach that is contextual and narrative, rather
than formal and abstract. Morality of care tempers the rules of rights and
justice, including those of human rights. It moves the researcher into
alliance with the health care provider and places both in the shoes of the
knowing caregiver: charging them with responsibility for the welfare of real
individuals, asking them to act professionally within observable
interpersonal relationships and in the context of real social forces, and
seeking to reduce harms.
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